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result applies only to venture capital firms that are supported but not owned outright by governments.
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Governments around the world have taken a strong interest in venture capital. This interest 
stems in part from the fact that some of the world’s most influential enterprises, such as 
Google, Intel or Apple were financed by venture capitalists. In addition, rapidly growing 
entrepreneurial enterprises are widely thought to be important sources of innovation, 
employment, and productivity growth. It is therefore not surprising that many governments 
have sponsored the provision of finance to entrepreneurial ventures.
1 The overall public sector 
commitment to venture capital in the world as a whole is substantial, including forgone taxes, 
outright subsidies, preferential regulation, and public provision of investment capital. 
Our main objective in this paper is to assess the record of government support for venture 
capital. Our performance measure is whether an enterprise allowed for successful exit of early 
investors through an initial public offering (IPO) or a third party acquisition. We seek to 
assess the impact of investment from government supported venture capitalists (GVCs) on an 
enterprise’s likelihood of such a successful exit. Our main finding is a non-monotonic 
relationship between GVC investment and exit performance: compared to a benchmark of 
enterprises financed by private venture capitalists, a small amount of GVC investment 
appears to be a good thing, but larger amounts of GVC decrease the likelihood of successful 
exit. 
We combine data from Thomson One (f.k.a. VentureXpert) and the Asian Venture Capital 
Journal to assemble a sample of 21852 enterprises based in 25 countries that received venture 
capital funding in the 2000–2008 period. Just under half of these enterprises were based in the 
United States but the data set also contains substantial representation from various European 
and East Asian economies, along with Australia, Brazil, Canada, India and Israel. The 
enterprises cover a wide range of industries but have strong representation in technology-
intensive sectors. Our unit of analysis is the individual enterprise, although we make use of 
data concerning multiple rounds of financing from multiple investors for a single enterprise. 
Our main dependent variable is whether an enterprise achieved an exit. Our main independent 
variable is the dollar-weighted share of GVC financing received by an enterprise. We also 
control for a variety of enterprise and other investor characteristics.  
To establish the fundamental non-monotonicity result we use two specifications. The first 
specification estimates higher-order polynomials of the GVC share. We find that a third order 
polynomial fits the data best, resulting in a wave-like GVC effect as depicted in Figure 1. Our 
second specification confirms this pattern using a set of categorical (dummy) variables: one 
for enterprises that receive some of their funding from GVCs but less than 50% (“minority” 
GVCs); one for enterprises that receive at least 50% but less than 100% of their funding from 
GVCs (“majority” GVCs); and one for enterprises that receive all of their funding from GVCs 
(“pure” GVCs). The base category is enterprises financed only by PVCs. 
We are primarily interested in how government support affects enterprise success – a 
treatment effect. We wish to distinguish this treatment effect from any selection effects – 
GVCs self-select into financing enterprises that would be successful anyway. We consider 
two distinct selection effects: dynamic selection and unobservable selection. Dynamic 
                                                            
1 Our working characterization of venture capitalists is that they are financial intermediaries that seek out and 
invest in high-potential entrepreneurial ventures, predominantly in high- technology sectors, and that often provide 
managerial assistance to enterprises that they invest in. See Sahlman (1990) for a more detailed discussion.  
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selection concerns the possibility that more successful enterprises raise more money, 
eventually also attracting some GVC funding. Under this hypothesis GVCs would invest 
mostly in later round when enterprises are already further along the path of success. Our 
empirical analysis does not support the dynamic selection hypothesis: most GVC financing is 
provided to enterprises that already receive some GVC financing in the first round of VC 
financing. Furthermore, the non-monotonic GVC effect holds even if we calculate GVC 
shares based only on the first venture capital round.  
Unobservable selection effects arise if GVCs self-select into supporting successful enterprises 
for reasons that we do not observe. If so, then the GVC identifier is endogenous in that it is 
affected by success, the dependent variable. The ability to select successful enterprises is in 
itself of interest, but is distinct from the treatment effect that we wish to identify. To account 
for the endogeneity associated with unobservable selection effects we use an instrumental 
variable approach based on local market conditions, similar to Berger et al. (2005). 
Specifically, for each country and each year we measure the availability of GVC financing. 
This availability measure is exogenous from the enterprise’s perspective, but correlates with 
the potentially endogenous choice of GVCs. We find that even after instrumentation the GVC 
effect persists, and retains its non-monotonic character. We are thus unable to reject the 
hypothesis that the GVC effect is causal, i.e., our evidence favours a non-monotonic effect of 
GVC finance on enterprise performance.  
To further understand the origins of the GVC effect, we break out our sample into different 
subsamples. We first ask whether the GVC effect is driven by peculiarities of any one 
country. Almost half the enterprises are in the US, but they do not drive the GVC effect, nor 
does any other one country.  
We then ask whether differences in investment timing account for the GVC effect. Private 
venture capitalists are known to invest pro-cyclically, so perhaps governments try to 
counterbalance this pattern by investing counter-cyclically? We establish that the GVC 
market share decreases in ‘hot markets’, defined as years when the total supply of venture 
capital in a particular country is high. Interestingly, the underperformance of majority GVC 
can then be traced primarily to investments made in such hot markets. Our interpretation is 
that, especially in times where private venture capital is abundant, GVCs are ill-suited to 
make investments without substantial inputs from PVCs.  
Once a government decides to sponsor venture capital activity, it has to make an important 
structural decision to either own the venture capital firm itself, or else to support privately 
owned venture capital firms with policies such as tax credits or matching funds. We examine 
whether there is a difference between government-owned and government-supported venture 
capitalists. The main insight here is that the superior performance of minority GVCs applies 
only to government-supported but not to government-owned venture capital firms. Again we 
interpret this finding as suggesting that having some market discipline helps make 
government promotion of venture capital more effective.  
Section 2 motivates the analysis from the perspective of the prior literature. Section 3 is 
devoted to a description of the data. Section 4 contains the main empirical analysis. Section 5 




2. MOTIVATION FROM PRIOR LITERATURE  
Early work on venture capital, including Sahlman (1990), and Amit, Glosten, and Muller 
(1990) emphasizes the importance of both adverse selection and agency problems in venture 
capital finance and, by inference, in entrepreneurial finance more broadly. The more recent 
literature explores how VCs with highly relevant technical background experience devote 
significant effort to obtaining information about particular enterprises and technologies, and 
then help to add value to these enterprises. See, for example, Amit, Brander and Zott (1998), 
Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann 
(2008), Chemmanur, Krishnan and Nandy (2008), or Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009a). However, 
the efforts by venture capitalists might not fully offset the market failure arising from 
asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance. We might still expect informational 
asymmetries to imply undersupply of entrepreneurial finance. Therefore, in the presence of 
asymmetric information of this type it is possible that government intervention might be 
helpful in partially offsetting the resulting market failure problems. Our research objective in 
this paper is based in large part on the fundamental question of whether government 
intervention can improve upon the response of private sector venture capitalists to information 
problems.  
A second type of problem or market failure that is relevant to government intervention in 
venture capital is the externality associated with R&D and innovation, leading to an 
underprovision of innovation. One firm’s innovation often provides benefits to other firms 
that can copy or learn from such innovation. These are positive externalities or spillovers. 
Because the original innovating firm cannot capture these external benefits it might undertake 
less innovative activity than would be best from a public policy point of view.
2Much effort 
has gone into estimating the extent of such externalities. One classic study of this type is 
Bresnahan (1986). See also Griliches (1992) and Jaffe (1996) for empirical evidence 
concerning the extent of R&D spillovers. Moreover, a recent literature suggests that venture 
capital promotes such innovation. See in particular Kortum and Lerner (2000), Gans and 
Stern (2000) Hellmann and Puri (2000), Hsu (2006) and Ozmel, Robinson and Stuart (2007). 
In addition, a small literature recognizes that organizational structure among venture capital 
firms matters. See Hellmann (2002), Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009b), Hellmann, Lindsey and 
Puri (2008) or Masulis and Nahata (2009). This literature has focussed mostly on comparing 
corporate venture capital with private independent venture capital, ignoring government 
venture capital. It is possible that government support for venture capital might boost 
innovation towards the efficient level by partially offsetting the market failure associated with 
insufficient innovation. 
Only a handful of papers directly address the effects of government intervention on venture 
capital. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003, 2004) theoretically examine the effect of tax policies 
for venture capital, and Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli (2006) empirically estimate the 
effect of R&D policies on venture capital. Leleux and Surlemont (2003) and Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2006) consider ‘crowding out’ of private venture capital by government 
sponsored venture capitalists. Lerner (1999, 2002) provides some evidence of success for the 
US Small Business Investment Research (SBIR) program. The most closely related work to 
                                                            
2There is an extensive literature on this subject, a valuable textbook treatment of which is provided by Tirole 
(1988, Ch. 10).  
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the current paper is Brander, Egan and Hellmann (2010), which addresses the performance of 
GVCs and PVCs in Canada. Our paper is also closely related to Lerner (2009), which 
provides a general critique of government efforts to promote venture capital finance, along 
with valuable suggestions for improvement. In this book, Lerner notes the need for more 
systematic research on the role of government in venture capital. This paper is an effort to 
make a step in that direction. 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We have two sources of venture capital data. The larger source, which has been widely used 
by researchers, is the Thomson One (T1) database of venture capital investments (formerly 
known as VentureXpert) provided by Thomson Reuters. From this database, we use all 
recorded enterprises that received their first venture capital funding between 2000 and 2008. 
The sample period was chosen to account for the fact that T1 has only limited international 
coverage prior to 2000. After 2000, T1 has good coverage for the US and significant coverage 
for Canada and Europe, along with some but limited coverage for Asia. We were able to 
augment the T1 data with data from Asian Venture Capital Journal (AVCJ), which has good 
coverage for Asia. The combined dataset contains 21,852 enterprises, of which 2,026 are a net 
addition due to the AVCJ database. There are 6,307 distinct venture capitalists represented in 
the data.
3 
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between true investments in venture capital and 
investments in other types of private equity, such as investments in large, well-established 
privately held enterprises. In order to do so, as a first step, we use the categorization provided 
by T1and AVCJ. We also do some additional checks and eliminate enterprises with more than 
U$1 billion in sales or that receive more than U$1 billion of investments (as venture capital 
investments are typically much less).  
All variables are defined in Table 1. The primary unit of observation is the enterprise that 
receives venture capital. Our main dependent variable is EXIT, which is an indicator variable 
that takes the value 1 if the enterprise went public or was acquired. T1 tends to underreport 
the exit events, so we also matched the VC-backed enterprises with the Global New Issuance 
and Mergers and Acquisitions databases in Thomson Reuters. Because we intend exit as a 
measure of success, we set exit equal to zero if we observe the exit value and find that it is 
below the total amount of investments. Ideally we would have liked to measure the success of 
venture capital investments with returns data. Short of that, it is sometime possible to use exit 
values or exit multiples as a measure of success (Brander, Egan and Hellmann, 2010). This 
dataset, however, does not offer any such opportunities. As it contains no return data and 
contains exit values in only 23% of all exits. We note, however, that using exits as a measure 
of success is standard in the venture capital literature (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Brander, 
Amit, and Antweiler, 2002). Importantly, Phalippou and Gottschalk (2009) actually 
demonstrate a high positive correlation between exit and returns to venture capitalists, 
                                                            
3The VC deals identified from T1 and AVCJ were made in 56 countries but with highly skewed distribution across 
countries. Our analysis focuses on the top 25 countries, which capture 96% of the VC deals among 56 countries. 
The main results are not affected by the exclusion of the additional 31 countries. The main reason for dropping 
them is that the instrumental variable approach in Section 4.3 requires each country to have a sufficient number of 
investments each year.  
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suggesting that exits are a reasonable measure of success.
4  Finally, it is likely that other 
aspects of the performance of enterprises such as employment or innovation are also 
correlated with exit performance. 
Our main independent variables relate to the presence of government sponsored venture 
capitalists. In identifying which venture capitalists are government sponsored venture 
capitalists (GVCs) there is an issue of definition – what should count as a GVC? We focus on 
two main channels of activity that serve to identify GVCs. One channel is the direct provision 
of venture capital through government-owned venture capital funds. The other channel 
includes all other forms of government support, such as government investments in 
independently managed venture capital funds that also rely on private investors, tax 
concessions to venture capitalists, and subsidies to venture capitalists or to supported 
enterprises. See Brander, Du and Hellmann (2010) for details. 
Our dataset includes enterprises from all major regions in the global economy. Table 2 shows 
the number of enterprises supported by venture capital on a country-specific basis. It indicates 
that the US accounts for 10,876 enterprises supported by VCs, 49.8% of the total. There is 
large variation in the frequency of GVC activity by country. In Canada, over 50% of the 
enterprises had GVC support, whereas in the US the rate of GVC support was only about one-
tenth as much – on the order of 5%. China, France and Germany all have relatively high 
levels of GVC involvement. 
Table 3 provides the main descriptive statistics, while Table 4 shows the correlations between 
the most important variables. Table 3 includes a comparison of enterprises financed entirely 
by PVCs with those financed in part by GVCs. The last column of Table 3 reports the p-value 
for the t-test of the difference of means between PVCs and GVCs. We note that 19,934 
enterprises (91% of enterprises) in the data set -- received only PVC funding, while the 
remaining 1,918 enterprises (9% of enterprises) received some GVC support. The variable 
“Exit” is an indicator variable showing whether a successful exit (IPO or acquisition) 
occurred. We note that 15.26% of the enterprises with pure PVC finance had successful exits, 
while 18.93% of the enterprises with some GVC finance had successful exits, with the 
difference being significant at the 1% level.  
 
4. THE EFFECT OF GVCS ON EXIT 
4.1 Empirical results 
Our main objective is to assess whether government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs) are 
associated with better or worse enterprise performance than private venture capitalists 
(PVCs). As described in the previous section, the unit of observation is the enterprise and the 
primary measure of performance is whether or not the enterprise experiences a successful exit 
event – either an IPO or a third party acquisition. We use the Probit regression model. If the 
probability of exit is Y and GVC is a measure of the share of government venture capital, then 
we are interested in a regression that has the form Y = f(GVC, X, ε), where X is a vector of 
control variables and ε is the random error.  
                                                            
4We track exits through 2009. Enterprises that were first financed in 2008 or 2007 are clearly less likely to have an 
exit. Our econometric analysis includes year fixed effects that correct for the enterprises’ different time horizons.  
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We pay particular attention to the functional form of the GVC measure to account for possible 
non-monotonicity. Our base measure is the share of the enterprise’s VC funding that comes 
from GVCs. For enterprises that are fully funded by PVCs, this variable is zero. At the other 
extreme, enterprises that receive all of their venture capital finance from GVCs have a value 
of 1 for this GVC share variable. For all other enterprises, the GVC variable is strictly 
between 0 and 1. We explore two possible methods for capturing non-monotonicities, one 
based on higher-order polynomials and the other on partitioning the interval [0,1] for the 
GVC share using a set of categorical indicator variables. 
We seek to explain performance on the basis of the extent of GVC activity after taking 
account of other factors. We use a complete set of enterprise country fixed effects to control, 
at least in part, for the many institutional differences across countries. They also control for 
country-to-country variations in data collection methods. We account for vintage effects by 
using calendar year fixed effects showing the year in which the enterprise received its first 
VC investment. These fixed effects are important to account for the mechanical fact that older 
firms have more time to exit. They also reflect the possibility that investment made in certain 
years generate better investments than in others, due to the business cycle and other related 
factors. We also include a set of dummy variables for industry. The data is categorized into 
the following industries: Biotechnology, Communications and Media, Computer Related, 
Medical/Heath/Life Science, Semiconductors/Other Electronics, and Non-High-technology. 
To ensure that the main GVC effects are not driven by other investor characteristics, we also 
control for average investor experience and for the presence of a foreign investor.
5 
In Panel A of Table 5 we show the results of using various polynomial functions of the GVC 
share. We denote the GVC share itself by GVC-Share – the linear term in any polynomial, 
GVC-Share-2– the square of the GVC share, GVC-Share-3– the cubic power, and GVC-
Share-4, the fourth power. Column (1) shows that if we simply use a linear form—regressing 
exit on the GVC share, there is no apparent significance of government venture capital. Even 
a quadratic form has no significant explanatory power, as shown in column (2). However, the 
cubic functional form shown in column (3) provides significant explanatory power. Each 
power of the GVC share is highly significant in itself and the three coefficients are therefore 
jointly significant.  
Figure 1 shows the cubic polynomial that can be traced out using the estimated coefficients of 
column (3). As can be seen from the figure, the cubic regression implies the striking result 
that a modest amount of GVC support is a good thing, but high levels are associated with 
lower exit performance. Column (4) shows that adding higher order polynomials adds 
essentially no explanatory power. We conclude that the cubic form yields the best fit with the 
data.  
The pattern shown in Figure 1 is quite striking and calls for some interpretation. The basic 
message is that a little GVC support is associated with good outcomes but that higher levels 
of GVC support are counterproductive. (We address the issue of causality and possible 
endogeneity of explanatory variables in section 4.3) It is as if GVC support acts like a 
complementary productive factor at low levels but becomes a problem once GVCs approach 
having a dominant position in the financing mix. This finding suggests that there are 
                                                            
5 In unreported regressions, we also added a dummy variable to capture whether the enterprise had any VC from 
the U.S., or even a set of dummy variables for investors from all countries in the sample, but found that our main 
results were not affected by this.  
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decreasing marginal benefits of GVC finance, with a positive marginal benefit at low levels 
and a negative marginal benefit at high levels of GVC.  
In the appendix we provide a formal derivation of this intuition using a simple production 
function where PVCs and GVCs can have complementarities. The most interesting insight 
from the appendix is that such a production function predicts that the relationship between 
GVC and performance should be characterized by a third-order polynomial, which is in line 
with our empirical finding.  
Our second approach measures the non-monotonicity using categorical variables. The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 5. The simplest categorical approach is to divide the sample 
of enterprises into just two categories: those that received some GVC finance and those that 
did not. Over 90% of all enterprises are funded purely by PVCs. We therefore use this as our 
omitted or base category. Column (1) shows the results of a regression using only the GVC 
indicator as an explanatory variable, along with the standard control variables. The GVC 
indicator is statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that there is a positive 
association between GVC finance and exit performance. However, the polynomial analysis 
above suggests that we should use a finer partition of the GVC share to identify possible non-
monotonicities.  
Approximately 3% of the enterprises are fully funded by GVCs, and we can treat these 
enterprises as a distinct category. For the values of GVC strictly between zero and one, where 
there is mixed financing we can partition the interval (0,1) in different ways. In column (2), 
GVC-Minor refers to enterprises with mixed funding that get less than 50% of their funding 
from GVCs while GVC-Major refers to enterprises with mixed funding that get 50% or more 
(but less than 100%) of their funding from GVCs. While the first column shows that overall 
GVC has a small positive effect, the second column reveals a strong non-monotonic effect. 
Enterprises receiving a minority share of their VC funding from GVCs have significantly 
better exit performance than the base category of no GVC funding. However, enterprises with 
the majority of their venture capital funding (but less than 100%) coming from GVCs have 
significantly worse exit performance than enterprises with pure PVC funding (and therefore 
have much worse performance than those with a minority GVC share). Those enterprises with 
pure GVC funding have exit performance that is very similar to the pure PVC enterprises. 
The third result column provides yet another representation of the data. GVC-1
st tercile refers 
to enterprises with mixed funding that get less than one third of their funding from GVCs, 
GVC-2
nd tercile to those that get between one and two thirds from GVCs, and GVC-3
rd tercile 
that get more than two thirds (but less than 100%) of their funding from GVCs. Enterprises 
with a positive but low GVC share – less than a third – have very good exit performance with 
the effect being highly significant in both statistical and economic terms. Enterprises in the 
intermediate category – with between 1/3 and 2/3 of their funding from GVCs – have exit 
performance that is not significantly different from and very similar to the base category of 
pure PVC enterprises. Enterprises with a high GVC share, but less than 100% have worse exit 
performance than the base category. Finally, enterprises with only GVC funding are similar to 
the base category.  
This categorical characterization closely matches the result from the cubic polynomial in 
Figure 1. We also tried finer partitions of the data with, for example, four interior categories 
or five interior categories, but no additional structure becomes apparent. We conclude that the  
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results from Panel B of Table 5 confirm the results from Panel A. For the subsequent analysis 
we will focus on the specifications of column (3) of Panel A and column (2) in Panel B of 
Table 5, as these provide a succinct characterization of the main non-monotonic effect that 
lends itself to further analysis. 
While we believe that exits are a better performance measure than IPOs (which only occur in 
less than 5% of all enterprises), in unreported regressions we examined whether the effects of 
GVC continue to apply when using IPOs as the dependent variable. We find that the overall 




4.2 Fundraising and dynamic selection 
Do the effects of GVC in Table 5 arise simply because of the amount of funding provided? To 
examine this we first need to establish the relationship between GVC and funding amounts. 
Table 3 indicates that there are no significant differences in the amount of funds raised by 
GVC-backed enterprises, but that enterprises with minority GVC raise significantly more 
funding, while enterprises with majority or pure GVC raise significantly less.
7 Controlling for 
the amount of funding may thus be important. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results when 
adding a control for the amount of funding. Column (1) reports the preferred categorical 
specification and column (2) the preferred polynomial specification. We find that all the GVC 
coefficients retain their signs and significance levels, suggesting that the results are not driven 
by investment amounts. 
A related concern is that enterprises with large funding needs eventually add GVC financing. 
Could the GVC effect due to some ‘window dressing’ effect where GVCs add a little money 
to larger deals at a later stage? We note that of the 1918 enterprises with GVC financing, 1560 
(i.e., 81.3%) already receive some GVC financing in their first round. We then separate early 
from later stage investments. In unreported regressions we find that enterprises that received 
minority GVC investment as part of their first round were more likely to have follow-up 
rounds, and also raised larger amounts. This suggests that enterprises with minority-GVC 
funding behave differently from the start. Panel B of Table 6 shows exit regressions using 
only first-round GVC measures, i.e., assigning enterprises to different investor classes based 
only on their initial round. We also control for the amount of funding in the first round.
8 We 
find similar results as before, except that the coefficient on GVC-Major, although still 
negative, is no longer significant at conventional significance levels.  The polynomial 
specification continues to be significant and retains a shape similar to that of Figure 1. 
 
4.3 Unobservable selection 
While the analysis of Section 4.2 addresses one type of selection effect – the possibility of 
investing at a later stage – we also need to be concerned about other selection effects, in 
                                                            
6 Details are available upon request.  
7 In unreported regression we verified that these correlations continue to hold in a regression framework with our 
usual enterprises and investor controls. 
8 Using the total investment amount instead of the first round investment amount does not affect any of our results.   
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particular selection based on variables known by GVCs but unobservable to us. More 
specifically, it is possible that both successful exit and the presence of GVC finance are 
affected by an omitted factor – enterprise potential – making the GVC explanatory variable 
endogenous. 
A standard approach to dealing with potential endogeneity of this type is to use instrumental 
variables. We need instruments that are themselves exogenous in the sense that they are not 
affected by the exit performance of the specific enterprise (the so-called “exclusion” 
restriction). However, the instruments do need to be related to the GVC share of the 
enterprise: they need to be variables that would identify exogenous variations in the GVC 
share. For the instrument we suggest that, other things equal, GVC shares would tend to be 
higher when the general availability of government supported venture capital is high. That is, 
we expect a given enterprise to have more GVC investment, other things equal, if that 
enterprise is seeking funding in a time and place when GVC funding is in plentiful supply. In 
the corporate finance literature, this approach of using local financing availability as 
instruments, specifically using local market aggregates, goes back to the seminal work by 
Berger et al. (2005).  
In our case, we can use the availability of GVC in a given country in a given year as the basis 
for constructing instruments. We thus consider each country-year as a separate local market. 
For each such market we calculate the fractions of enterprises that receive a financing round 
where GVCs provide a minority, majority, or all of the funding. Because a firm may be 
fundraising at different points in time, we then weight each fundraising event by the fraction 
of dollars raised in that round relative to the total amount of funds raised by the enterprise. 
Thus, in effect, we construct an instrument representing the overall availability of GVC 
funding, broken down by each type of GVC financing. These instruments are continuous 
variables and can readily be used in both the categorical and polynomial regression models. 
We also construct analogous instruments for the first-round GVC variables.  
In the unreported first stage regressions we find that the instruments are statistically highly 
significant in terms of predicting the variables of interest.
9 Moreover, the F-test for their joint 
significance for all IV regressions in Table 7 is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that all 
instruments are significantly correlated with the endogenous variables. Table 7 then shows the 
(second stage) instrumented regressions. The main insight is that all coefficients that were 
significant in Table 6 remain significant, although their level of significance varies to some 
extent. The Wald statistics rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity. This suggests that there may 
be some endogenous self-selection, which justifies the use of instruments.
10 However, once 
the endogenous selection effects are purged using instrumental variables, it appears that a 
treatment effect remains. Put differently, the by now familiar non-monotonic effect on exit 
performance remains present even after controlling for unobservable selection effects. 
While the results of Table 7 suggest that our effects ‘survive’ endogeneity tests, we also want 
to add a word of caution. We believe that our instruments are reasonable, and the best 
available, but they also have limitations. One obvious limitation is the absence of any true 
                                                            
9 Specifically, the IV for GVC-Minor is significant at 1% for GVC-Minor. The same pattern applies with IV for 
GVC-Major and GVC-Major, as well as for the IV of GVC-Full and GVC-Full. In the first stage of the polynomial 
specification, at least two of the three instrument variables are significant at 1% for each of the variables GVC-
Share-1/2/3. In unreported regressions we also considered higher order polynomials of market aggregates but 
found them to be weak instruments. 
10 Since we have three variables and three instruments no test of overidentification is possible.  
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natural experiment, something that would be particularly hard to come by in our cross-country 
setting. Another limitation is that while our instrumental variable approach can account for 
unobservable selection patterns within markets, it cannot (and doesn’t claim to) capture a 
higher level of endogeneity between market conditions and the availability of government 
GVC support, i.e., the possibility that governments deliberately choose to be more active in 
certain markets than others. This doesn’t pose a problem for the estimation of Table 7 which 
is concerned with endogeneity at the enterprise level, but it does raise an interesting question 
of whether market circumstances - and in particular whether governments are more or less 
active - affect the relationship between GVC and exit performance. The next section will turn 
to this issue. 
 
5. BREAKING OUT THE GVC EFFECT 
The analysis of Section 4 identifies a non-monotonic effect of GVC and suggests that reverse 
causality does not seem to be the driving force behind this finding. In this section we seek to 
deepen our understanding of why such an effect might arise. For this we break out the data 
into subsamples, to identify under which circumstances the GVC effect is most prevalent.  
 
5.1Is the effect program specific? 
A natural question to ask is whether the effect is driven by the peculiarities of one country. 
Almost half of the enterprises in our sample are US enterprises, so the main concern here is 
that the GVC effect stems from specifics of the US government’s approach to venture capital.  
To examine this we divide our sample into two subsamples, one for US enterprises and the 
other for non-US enterprises. The first two columns of Table 8 compare the financing mix for 
U.S. versus non-U.S. enterprises. We find that enterprises outside the US are almost three 
times as likely to receive some GVC funding (12.98% outside the US versus 4.53% in the 
US). Moreover, GVC-Major and GVC-Pure account for less than 1% (less than 100 
enterprises) in the US. This shows that GVCs play a relatively minor role in the US venture 
capital market.
11 
To examine whether the GVC effect is driven by the US, we rerun the exit regression within 
the two subsamples. Throughout this section we limit our attention to the categorical 
regression model with all rounds (Column 1 of Table 6).
12 The first pair of columns in Table 9 
reports the results of separating the US and non-US samples. For enterprises outside the US 
we observe the familiar pattern that GVC-Minor is positive and significant while GVC-Major 
has a significant negative effect. For US enterprises we observe the same signs, but the 
coefficients are smaller and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the US is not 
responsible for the non-monotonic GVC effect. In unreported regressions we also verified that 
                                                            
11 Another way of putting the point is that the private venture capital market in the U.S. is so large that it swamps 
the segment of the market supported by governments. In absolute terms, however, total GVC support in the U.S. is 
substantial. Indeed, the total number of enterprises with GVC support in the U.S. substantially exceeds that of any 
other country. 
12 This specification is the easiest to interpret. It also has the larger number of GVC investments, which helps in 
the subsamples.  
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the results continue to hold if we eliminate any other country from the sample. We thus 
conclude that the main GVC effect is not specific to any one country. 
 
5.2Timing of investments 
It is well known that venture capital markets are highly cyclical (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
One of the possible roles of government in venture capital markets is to ensure a more steady 
supply of funds, possibly overcoming market herding effects. If GVCs are relatively stable or  
steady investors compared with PVCs, does this explain some of the performance 
differences? 
To examine the importance of pro- vs. counter-cyclical timing, we develop a simple measure 
of hot vs. cold markets. We define a market as ‘hot’ if the aggregate amount of funds raised 
by enterprises in a particular country and a particular year is above the average amount of 
funds raised in that country. To be able to uniquely classify enterprises into hot versus cold 
cycles, we only focus on their first venture capital round.
13 The second pair of columns in 
Table 8 shows how the market shares of the various types of GVCs differ by hot vs. cold 
markets. We find a striking result that GVCs have indeed a much higher market share in cold 
markets (11.24%) than in hot markets (7.35%). Moreover, this pattern holds true (and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level) across all three types of GVC financing (minority, 
majority and pure GVC). Interestingly, enterprises initially financed in cold markets have a 
higher rate of successful exit (16.98% vs. 14.77%).  
To ask whether the counter-cyclical timing of GVC investment helps to explain the 
performance of enterprises supported by GVCs we rerun the exit regressions within the hot 
vs. cold market subsamples. The second pair of columns in Table 9 shows that minority 
GVCs have a superior performance in both hot and cold markets, although the coefficient is 
larger and more significant for hot markets. Moreover, the GVC-Major coefficient is 
insignificant for cold markets but much more negative and highly significant for hot markets. 
This suggests that timing does matter. The most important finding is that the 
underperformance of majority GVC investment occurs only in hot markets. Our interpretation 
is that in times where private venture capital is abundant, GVCs are less likely to succeed if 
they dominate the investment in a particular enterprise. However, in times where private 
venture capital is sparse, this is less of a problem. 
 
5.3 Types of government intervention 
Once a government is convinced of the need for intervention, a key question becomes the 
mechanism of intervention. There is a long-standing debate in the field of public economics 
regarding the benefits of government ownership versus regulation (De Alessi, 1974). La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), for example, examine the benefits of 
government ownership versus regulation of banks. In the context of venture capital, the main 
trade-off is between the government owning and operating a venture capital fund versus the 
government using a variety of support mechanisms for otherwise privately owned venture 
                                                            
13 An alternative would be to classify enterprises into hot markets if more than half of their entire funding was 
raised in hot markets. This alternative definition generates very similar results.  
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capital funds. Examples of government-owned venture capital funds include Singapore’s 
EDBI, Canada’s Business Development Bank, or In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s own venture capital 
fund in the US. Examples of government-supported venture capital funds include the US 
SBICs which receive matching funds from the government, Canada’s Labor-sponsored 
venture capital corporations, which benefit from tax credits, or the UK’s Innovation 
Investment Fund, which acts as a fund of funds.  
We thus break out GVCs into two subcategories: government-owned (GOVCs) and 
government-supported (GSVCs). We classify an enterprise as GOVC-backed whenever at 
least one of its investors is a GOVC. The third pair of columns in Table 8 focuses on GVC-
backed enterprises and shows the distribution of enterprises receiving GOVC vs. GSVC. 
GOVC-backed enterprises account for just under 30% of all GVC-backed enterprises. 
GOVCs are more likely to be majority or full investors, whereas GSVCs are more likely to be 
minority investors.  
The third pair of columns in Table 9 compares the performance of GOVCs vs. GSVCs. 
Unlike the previous two models of Table 9, we cannot just create separate subsamples, since 
the distinction between GOVCs vs. GSVCs has no equivalent among PVCs. We therefore 
estimate the model in the full sample, but breaking out the GVC effects into two subgroups. 
The main result is that the superior performance of minority GVCs can be attributed to 
GSVCs. Minority GOVCs don’t have a significant effect on exits whereas the coefficient for 
Minority GSVC is large and highly significant. For majority GVCs the effect is slightly more 
negative for GOVCs than for GSVCs, although both coefficients have similar significance 
levels with P-values of 10.9% for GOVCs and 11.6% for GSVCs.  
Our interpretation of this result is that government ownership poses an obstacle to effective 
cooperation between GVCs and PVCs. GOVCs are less likely to take minority positions, and 
if the do, they are less successful. Instead they focus on taking majority stakes (including pure 
GVC financing) resulting in weaker performance. A likely reason for this lower level of 
cooperation with private market investors is that GOVCs are likely to have multiple 
objectives that may interfere with the pure profit orientation of PVCs.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper compares the exit performance of enterprises that obtained at least part of their 
funding from government sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs) with those that received 
funding from just private venture capitalists. Our most striking result is something we have 
not seen mentioned in previous work: GVC activity seems to have a non-monotonic 
relationship with successful exits (IPOs and acquisitions). A modest amount of GVC finance 
seems to improve the performance of entrepreneurial ventures relative to ventures supported 
purely by private venture capitalists (PVCs). However, high levels of support from GVCs are 
associated with weaker performance. Thus, a little bit of government support appears to be a 
good thing but too much government support has the opposite effect. 
Our dataset has the advantage of being a large sample with broad international coverage of 
venture capital investment. However, it does not allow us to go very far in looking ‘inside the 
black box’ by assessing what these venture capitalists do for their client enterprises, aside 
from providing funds. Prior work of Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) and Bottazzi, Da Rin  
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and Hellmann (2006) uses survey-based data to identify the sources of venture capitalists’ 
value-added, while Chemmanur et al. (2008) use census data to examine total factor 
productivity. The evidence in this paper suggests that GVCs may be helpful in providing 
certain kinds of support, including financial support, but may become less useful when they 
have actual control over business decisions. If they lack control then the usual concerns about 
governments subverting sound economic objectives to achieve alternative objectives are less 
likely to arise. Put differently, the results of this paper suggest that GVC finance may be at its 
most effective when it remains disciplined by private venture capital. Future research might 
look at exploring the precise channels through which this market discipline works. 
This paper focuses on one important summary performance measure: successful exits. While 
this measure is correlated with other performance measures, such as investor returns, 
employment and innovation, future research investigating such measures in greater detail 
would be a valuable complement to this paper.  
Our analysis shows that there are significant differences between government ownership and 
government support of venture capital firms, broadly suggesting that support outperforms 
ownership. However, there are a variety of support mechanisms that governments use, 
including matching funds, tax credits, fund of funds, along with other policies. A question for 
future research is which of these approaches is most effective, both from a government fiscal 
perspective, as well as from a broader social policy perspective.   
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Table 1: List of Variables 




Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the enterprise provides successful exits for its 
investors through IPO or acquisition. Exit is set to 0 if exit value is known to 




Total amount of funding provided by GVCs divided by total amount of 
funding provided by all investors; funding is calculated over all financing 
rounds. If in any round no information is available on the relative amounts 
provided by the different investors, it is assumed that all investors provided 
equal amounts. 
 




Dummy variable, equal to 1 if there is at least one GVC that investing in the 









Dummy variable, equal to 1 if GVC-Share is greater or equal than 0.5 and 
strictly less than 1. 
 
GVC-Pure  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if GVC-Share is equal to 1. 
 
FRGVC-(...)  Same as above GVC measures, except that the funding shares are based solely 




The natural logarithm of the total amount of funding received by the 
enterprise. 
 
FR Investment  The natural logarithm of the amount of funding received by the enterprise in 
the first financing round. 
 
Country fixed effects  A set of dummy variables for each country, that takes the value 1 if the 
enterprise is from that country; 0 otherwise 
  
Industry fixed effects  A set of dummy variables for the following industries: Biotechnology, 
Communications and Media, Computer Related, Medical/Heath/Life Science, 
Semiconductors/Other Electronics, and Non-High-technology. Each dummy 
takes the value 1 if the enterprise is from that industry; 0 otherwise 
  
Year fixed effects  A set of dummy variables for each year between 2000 and 2008, that takes the 
value 1 if the enterprise received its first venture capital round in that year; 0 
otherwise 
  
Investor Experience  The enterprise’s average investor experience is the dollar-weighted average of 
its investors’ experiences, which is calculated as the number of enterprises 
financed in the past five years prior to the current financing round.  
 





Table 2: Venture Capital Activities 
This table presents VC activities in25 countries between 2000 and 2008. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. The unit of observation is the individual enterprise. Number of Enterprises reports number of 
enterprises financed by VCs. Enterprises with GVC finance (%) reports percentage of enterprises 
financed by at least one GVCs. Enterprises with an exit (%) and Enterprises with an IPO (%) report 






GVC finance (%) 
Enterprises with 
an exit (%) 
Enterprises with 
an IPO (%) 
United States  10876  4.53   17.41   1.56  
United Kingdom  1515  3.37   12.94   3.96  
South Korea  1393  4.09   13.21   13.93  
China  1309  21.08   15.66   13.29  
India  857  17.74   14.94   7.23  
France  816  24.88   12.38   4.04  
Japan  772  1.17   14.64   8.29  
Australia  660  4.09   18.18   8.79  
Germany  492  34.76   10.57   3.66  
Canada  427  51.99   21.78   6.09  
Israel  358  13.97   13.41   4.47  
Sweden  313  2.88   12.14   2.56  
Spain  251  1.99   7.57   1.59  
Finland  205  8.29   9.76   0.98  
Brazil  179  27.37   12.29   6.15  
Denmark  174  4.02   8.62   2.30  
Singapore  165  5.45   18.18   7.88  
Netherlands  163  1.23   6.13   2.45  
Ireland  158  9.49   9.49   0.63  
Belgium  150  25.33   8.00   3.33  
Italy  147  7.48   9.52   4.08  
Hong Kong  130  11.54   20.00   16.92  
New Zealand  120  4.17   10.83   3.33  
Switzerland  118  20.34   15.25   1.69  












Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table describes the sample in which the unit of observation is the individual enterprise. Mean and 
Standard Deviation of variables are reported for the entire sample, the PVC sample, and the GVC 
sample. The last column report P-values of differences in means between the PVC sample and the 
GVC sample, based on the two-sample T Test (two-sided) assuming unequal variance. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
 Entire  Sample  PVC  GVC  PVC-GVC 
Variable Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.   
EXIT  21852  0.1558   0.3627   0.1526   0.3596   0.1893   0.3918   0.0001*** 
IPO  21852  0.0445   0.2063   0.0419   0.2003   0.0719   0.2585   0.0000*** 
GVC-Indicator  21852  0.0878   0.2830   0.0000   0.0000   1.0000   0.0000    
GVC-Minor  21852  0.0422   0.2010   0.0000   0.0000   0.4807   0.4998    
GVC-Major  21852  0.0206   0.1420   0.0000   0.0000   0.2346   0.4239    
GVC-Pure  21852  0.0250   0.1561   0.0000   0.0000   0.2847   0.4514    
FRGVC-Minor  21852  0.0209   0.1429   0.0000   0.0000   0.2377   0.4258    
FRGVC-Major  21852  0.0203   0.1409   0.0000   0.0000   0.2310   0.4216    
FRGVC-Pure  21852  0.0302   0.1713   0.0000   0.0000   0.3446   0.4754    
Total Investment  21852  24.539  57.528  24.434  58.1972   25.6319   50.042  0.3240 
FR  Investment  21852  9.1146  19.818 9.0978 19.9754  9.2895  18.113 0.6609 
Investor 
Experience 
21852  27.4418 44.549 28.258 46.0142  18.9578  22.947 
0.0000*** 
Foreign  VCs  21852  0.1565  0.3186 0.1537 0.3208  0.1856  0.2925 0.0000*** 
Non-High-Tech 5479 25.07    25.08   24.97    0.9163 
Biotechnology 1346  6.16    5.97   8.08    0.0011*** 
Communications 
and Media 
2971 13.6    13.6    13.56   
0.9571 
Computer Related  8541  39.09    39.49    34.93    0.0001*** 
Medical/Health/ 
Life Science 




1649 7.55    7.33    9.75   
0.0006*** 
2000 6120  28.01    28.19    26.12    0.0497** 
2001 2704  12.37    12.04    15.8    0.0000*** 
2002 1513  6.92    6.66    9.7    0.0000*** 
2003 1403  6.42    6.16    9.18    0.0000*** 
2004 1577  7.22    7.15    7.87    0.2625 
2005 1851  8.47    8.53    7.82    0.2689 
2006 2233  10.22    10.36    8.76    0.0188** 
2007 2360  10.8    11.12    7.46    0.0000*** 
2008 2091  9.57    9.79    7.3    0.0001*** 
No. of Enterprises  21852      19934    1918      
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Table 4 
The matrix is based on the sample of 21,852enterprises. All variables are defined in Table 1. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
ID  Variable  Name  1  2 3 4 5 6  7  8 
1 Exit  1           
2 GVC-Indicator  0.0286***  1         
3 GVC-Minor  0.0529***  0.6766***  1        
4 GVC-Major  -0.0152* 0.4675***  -0.0304***  1        
5 GVC-Pure  -0.0025 0.5161***  -0.0336*** -0.0232*** 1      
6 Total  Investment  0.0532*** 0.0059  0.0681***  -0.0311*** -0.0488*** 1    
7 Investor  Experience  0.0213*** -0.0591*** -0.0176*** -0.0337*** -0.0538*** 0.1071*** 1   










Table 5: Effects of GVC on Exit 
 
Panel A: GVC on Exit – Polynomials 
The unit of observation in these Probit regressions is the individual enterprise. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. All FE stands for All Fixed Effects, meaning country industry and year fixed effects. Robust 
and clustered standard errors at the enterprise’s country level are reported in parentheses, where ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Exit Exit Exit Exit 
GVC-Share 0.0367  0.377  3.555***  4.686*** 
  (0.0905)  (0.332) (0.637) (1.443) 
GVC-Share-2   -0.389  -11.50***  -18.96** 
    (0.347) (1.719) (8.655) 
GVC-Share-3     8.011***  22.02 
     (1.156)  (15.43) 
GVC-Share-4     -7.690 
     (8.205) 
Investor  Experience  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Foreign  VCs  0.185** 0.183** 0.176** 0.175** 
  (0.0818) (0.0836) (0.0829) (0.0823) 
All  FE  YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.814***  -0.817*** -0.822*** -0.825*** 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.0857 0.0859 0.0875 0.0876 





Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: GVC on Exit - Categorical variables 
The unit of observation in these Probit regressions is the individual enterprise. All variables are defined 
in Table 1, except for GVC-1st Tercile, which is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if GVC-Share is strictly 
greater than 0 and strictly less than 1/3, GVC-2nd Tercile, which is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if 
GVC-Share is greater or equal than 1/3 and strictly less than 2/3, and GVC-3rd Tercile, which is a 
dummy variable, equal to 1 if GVC-Share is greater or equal than 2/3 and strictly less than 1. All FE 
stands for All Fixed Effects, meaning country industry and year fixed effects. Robust and clustered 
standard errors at the enterprise’s country level are reported in parentheses, where ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES Exit  Exit  Exit 
GVC-Indicator 0.127**     
 (0.0523)     
GVC-Minor   0.245***   
   (0.0710)   
GVC-Major   -0.162**   
   (0.0720)   
GVC-1st Tercile      0.288*** 
     (0.0711) 
GVC-2nd Tercile      0.0014 
     (0.106) 
GVC-3rd Tercile      -0.321* 
     (0.194) 
GVC-Pure   0.0733  0.0725 
   (0.0960)  (0.0959) 
Investor Experience  0.0003  0.0002  0.0002 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Foreign VCs  0.176**  0.163**  0.163** 
 (0.0866)  (0.0815)  (0.0820) 
All FE  YES  YES  YES 
Constant -0.835***  -0.830***  -0.828*** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0863  0.0873  0.0873 
No. of Obs.  21852  21852  21852  
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Table 6: Effects of GVC on Exit: Controlling for Total Investment 
 
Panel A: Base model 
The unit of observation in these Probit regressions is the individual enterprise. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. All FE stands for All Fixed Effects, meaning country industry and year fixed effects. Robust 
and clustered standard errors at the enterprise’s country level are reported in parentheses, where ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Exit  Exit 
GVC-Minor 0.172***   
 (0.0587)   
GVC-Major -0.171**   
 (0.0808)   
GVC-Pure 0.118   
 (0.0855)   
GVC-Share   2.931*** 
  (0.538) 
GVC-Share-2   -9.866*** 
  (1.498) 
GVC-Share-3   7.045*** 
  (1.042) 
Total Investment  0.0712***  0.0716*** 
 (0.0134)  (0.0138) 
Investor Controls  YES  YES 
ALL FE  YES  YES 
Constant -0.929***  -0.925*** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0933  0.0936 




Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: First rounds model  
 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Exit  Exit 
FRGVC-Minor 0.206***   
 (0.0734)   
FRGVC-Major -0.0882   
 (0.0894)   
FRGVC-Pure 0.0360   
 (0.0903)   
FRGVC-Share   2.591*** 
  (0.780) 
FRGVC-Share-2   -8.096*** 
  (2.383) 
FRGVC-Share-3   5.549*** 
  (1.686) 
FR Investment  0.106***  0.106*** 
 (0.0130)  (0.0131) 
Investor Controls  YES  YES 
ALL FE  YES  YES 
Constant -0.917***  -0.607*** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0959  0.0959 




Table 7: Exit Regressions with Instrumental Variables 
This table reports results of second stage instrumental variable Probit regressions. The unit of 
observation is each individual enterprise. All variables are defined in Table 1. All FE stands for All 
Fixed Effects, meaning country industry and year fixed effects. The instruments are based on local 
markets, defined as country – year pairs. For each financing round we calculate the fraction of 
enterprises that received funding in that market under the GVC-minor, GVC-major and GVC-Pure 
categories. For each enterprise we then calculate the dollar-weighted average of these market fractions. 
Due to non-convergence of the maximum likelihood estimators, the Heckman two-step procedure was 
followed. Standard errors at the enterprise’s country level are reported in parentheses, where ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
  
Panel A: Base model 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Exit Exit 
GVC-Minor 1.269**   
 (0.630)   
GVC-Major -3.358***   
 (1.076)   
GVC-Pure 0.442   
 (0.487)   
GVC-Share   31.46*** 
   (9.812) 
GVC-Share-2   -[]109.7*** 
   (32.37) 
GVC-Share-3   78.72*** 
   (22.95) 
Total Investment  0.0594***  0.0565*** 
 (0.0126)  (0.0116) 
Investor Controls  YES  YES 
ALL FE  YES  YES 
Constant -0.883***  -0.881*** 




Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: First rounds model 
 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Exit Exit 
FRGVC-Minor 3.415***   
 (1.189)   
FRGVC-Major -0.836   
 (1.041)   
FRGVC-Pure 0.0095   
 (0.404)   
FRGVC-Share   48.35*** 
   (17.14) 
FRGVC-Share-2   -144.3*** 
   (53.33) 
FRGVC-Share-3   96.10*** 
   (36.46) 
FR Investments  0.0833***  0.0823*** 
 (0.0131)  (0.0132) 
Investor Controls  YES  YES 
ALL FE  YES  YES 
Constant -0.592***  -0.586*** 




Table 8: Breakout for investments 
This table tabulates the means of GVC measures and EXIT by whether or not the enterprise is located in the U.S., whether or not the enterprise was first financed in a hot 
market, and whether or not the enterprise receives any funding from VCs fully owned by the government. While the location and investment timing are constructed based on 
the entire sample, full government ownership is constructed based on a sub-sample where the enterprises receive funding from at least one GVC. We performed a t-test for 
the difference across the two subsamples, and use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
 
   Enterprise is located  Enterprise was first financed in  GVC is 
   in US  outside US  hot market  cold market  government-owned  government-
supported 
GVC  Indicator  0.0453*** 0.1298  0.0735*** 0.1124  NA  NA 
GVC-Minor  0.0323*** 0.052  0.0368*** 0.0515  0.3876***  0.5196 
GVC-Major  0.0084*** 0.0327  0.0167*** 0.0272  0.2743**  0.2180 
GVC-Pure 0.0047*** 0.0451  0.0403*** 0.0692  0.3381***  0.2624 
EXIT  0.1741*** 0.1378  0.1477*** 0.1698  0.1487***  0.2062 




Table 9: Breakout of exit regressions 
The unit of observation in these Probit regressions is the individual enterprise. The first two columns report regression results based on two sub-samples in which the enterprise are located in or 
outside of U.S. Columns (3) and (4) report regression results based on two sub-samples in which the enterprises were first financed in the hot market or cold market. Regressions in Columns (5) 
and (6) are based on one Probit regression where the three GVC variables are interacted with an indicator variable of whether any of the GVCs was government-owned. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. ‘All other controls’ includes Total Investment, Investor Experience, Foreign VCs, Country, Industry, Year dummies. Robust and clustered standard errors at the enterprise’s country 
level (except for the within US subsample) are reported in parentheses, where ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
   Enterprise is located  Enterprise was first financed in  GVC is 
   in US  outside US  hot market  cold market  government-owned  government-supported 
GVC-Minor  0.119 0.212**  0.210***  0.116** 0.0294  0.207*** 
   (0.0760) (0.100)  (0.0789) (0.0564)  (0.189)  (0.0659) 
GVC-Major  -0.0054 -0.207* -0.260*** -0.0867  -0.246 -0.143 
  
(0.167) (0.108) (0.0890)  (0.0989)  (0.156)  (0.0892) 
GVC-Pure  0.203 0.107 0.194 0.0554  0.215  0.0696 
  
(0.220) 0.212**  (0.138) (0.115) (0.180)  (0.0902) 
All other controls 
 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Square 
 
0.1276 0.0706 0.1107 0.0835  0.0935 
No. of Obs. 
 
10876 10976 13855 7997  21852  
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Figure 1: The effect of GVC share on exit 
This graph shows the shape of the third order polynomial that is implied by the coefficients of the 
regression in Column 3 of Table 5. Specifically, it shows the equation  
Y = 3.555*GVC – 11.500*GVC
2 + 8.011*GVC
3. 
Note that the vertical y-axis does not measure a probability, it only shows the coefficient values for the 
(non-linear) Probit model. Moreover, note that the equation above has no intercept, implying that y= 0 
















Theoretical interpretation of decreasing complementarities 
To interpret the fundamental non-monotonicity of Table 5 it is useful to briefly consider a 
mathematical representation of the interaction between GVC finance and PVC finance in generating 
successful exit events. This is far from a full-fledged economic theory, but helps to clarify our 
interpretation of the main results from Table 5. Let us think of exit as the output of a production 
function, where we focus on the investor mix as the key input, and where all other inputs X enter 
separately into the production function. We use the following simple functional form: 
Y = a*PVC + b*GVC + c*PVC*g(GVC) + h(X)  
where g(GVC) = d*GVC – e*GVC
2, a,b,c,d,e> 0, and where h(X) is a general production function for 
all the other inputs X.  
The interesting part of this production function is that instead of assuming standard linear 
complementarities (c*PVC*GVC) we allow for diminishing marginal complementarity between GVC 
and PVC finance. Formally, we capture this by allowing the GVC share to have a non-linear effect on 
the complementarities term. For simplicity we use the quadratic function g(GVC) = d*GVC – e*GVC
2, 
so that the marginal complementarity benefit is given by  g' = d – 2e*GVC, which is a decreasing 
function of GVC. This term turns negative for GVC > d/2e.  Using PVC = 1 – GVC we obtain the 
following expression for Y.  
Y = (b – a + c*d)*GVC – (c*e + d)*GVC
2 + e*GVC
3 + a + h(X) 
The effect of GVC can thus be expressed as a third order polynomial where the coefficient on the linear 
term is positive (provided (b + c*d) > a). The coefficient on the squared term is negative and the 
coefficient on the cubic term is positive. This prediction matches the empirical results from Panel A of 
Table 5. This clarifies why we interpret the fundamental non-monotonicity as the result of decreasing 
marginal complementarity of GVC with PVC. 
 